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Abstract
We introduce abstract preference frameworks to study
general properties common across a variety of prefer-
ence formalisms. In particular, we study strong equiv-
alence in preference formalisms and their separabil-
ity. We identify abstract postulates on preference frame-
works, satisfied by most of the currently studied prefer-
ence formalisms, that lead to characterizations of both
properties of interest.
Introduction
The literature on preferences and preference formalisms
is vast; the collection of articles edited by Goldsmith and
Junker (2008) and the monograph by Kaci (2011) provide
good overviews and are excellent sources of references. The
main objectives of the area are to design expressive yet in-
tuitive languages to model preferences, and to characterize
the notions of optimality they define. Recently, researchers
identified another fundamental problem related to prefer-
ence languages, that of characterizing various notions of
equivalence of preference theories. A particularly important
one is strong equivalence (Faber, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran
2012). Strong equivalence guarantees semantic-preserving
replacements of parts of preference theories, the so-called
replacement property, and is fundamental for understanding
preference rewriting and modularity.
Preference formalisms are inherently nonmonotonic, that
is, additional preferences can add to the set of optimal out-
comes and not only remove from them. Consequently, they
figured prominently in the studies of nonmonotonic logics
(Delgrande et al. 2004). Faber et al. (2012) observed that as
in other nonmonotonic formalisms, the standard notion of
equivalence, requiring that two theories have the same pre-
ferred outcomes, is too weak to guarantee the replacement
property. Building on earlier work on strong equivalence
of logic programs with the answer-set semantics (Lifschitz,
Pearce, and Valverde 2001), Faber et al. (2012) introduced
and studied strong equivalence of preference theories in the
language of answer-set optimization (ASO) problems.
Our goal is to identify general principles behind strong
equivalence in order to extend the results of Faber et al.
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(2012) to other preference formalisms. The main challenge
is the vast diversity of preference formalisms. To overcome
it, we propose the notion of an abstract preference frame-
work and study strong equivalence in that language.
Preference languages have to capture two phenomena: (i)
physical and logical constraints on the domain of interest
that must be obeyed — they give rise to intended or feasible
outcomes; and (ii) preferences that describe what is desirable
(but not absolutely necessary)— they are employed to select
out of the intended outcomes themost preferred or desirable
ones. The distinction between the two is often explicit in the
language, such that different constructs specify constraints
and preferences, and preference theories are pairs consist-
ing of a theory in a “pure” constraint formalism and another
theory in a “pure” preference one. Following the terminol-
ogy proposed by Faber et al. (2012), we refer to these two
components as generators and selectors, respectively. Ex-
amples of such preference systems include logic programs
with optimization statements (Buccafurri, Leone, and Rullo
2000; Simons, Niemela¨, and Soininen 2002), ASO problems
(Faber, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2012), and formalisms
obtained by extending common preference languages such
as CP-nets with a constraint language (Boutilier et al. 2004).
However, in other languages such a distinction is less
clear. Theories are built of statements that combine con-
straints with preferences in ways that make it hard to
separate their effects. Examples of such languages in-
clude prioritized versions of logic programming and default
logic (Brewka and Eiter 1999; Delgrande et al. 2004) and
logic programs with ordered disjunctions (LPODs) (Brewka,
Niemela¨, and Syrja¨nen 2004). In such formalisms, one can
define the concepts of a generator and a selector. The prob-
lem is how to represent an arbitrary theory as a pair consist-
ing of a generator and a selector, and whether such a “separa-
tion” is even possible. The preference framework that we in-
troduce here provides a setting that encompasses both types
of preference languages and allows us to study the question
of “separability” in abstract terms.
The concepts of generator and selector theories suggest
several forms of strong equivalence. We say that preference
theories x, y are strongly equivalent (strongly generator
equivalent, strongly selector equivalent) if for every prefer-
ence (generator, selector) theory z, the extensions of x and of
y with z have the same semantics, that is, the same preferred
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(or optimal) outcomes. The main objective when studying
strong equivalence is to find characterizations which do not
refer to z and can be stated entirely in terms of theories x
and y being compared. Such characterizations are known for
nonmonotonic logics (Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde 2001;
Turner 2003) and for some specific preference formalisms
(Faber and Konczak 2006; Faber, Tompits, and Woltran
2008; Faber, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2012). By impos-
ing abstract postulates on the semantics of preference frame-
works, we obtain the result already anticipated by Faber et
al. (2012), namely that for many preference formalisms the
characterization of strong equivalence is fully determined by
characterizations of the simpler notions of strong generator
and strong selector equivalence. Under some additional pos-
tulates on preferences we also obtain a natural abstract char-
acterization of strong selector equivalence.
The main contributions of our paper are as follows (for
full proofs, see (Faber, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2013)):
• We introduce the notion of an abstract preference frame-
work. Abstract preference frameworks make weak syntac-
tic assumptions and their semantics is specified in terms
of intended outcomes and preference preorders.
• We introduce abstract generator and selector frameworks
for describing constraints and preferences independently
of each other. We use these notions to define separated ab-
stract preference frameworks which, speaking informally,
are the products of generator and selector frameworks.
• For general abstract preference frameworks we study the
problem of their separability, that is representability by
means of a separated framework, and provide sufficient
conditions to guarantee that property.
• We characterize strong equivalence in separated prefer-
ence frameworks in terms of characterizations of strong
equivalence in generator and selector frameworks. We
then lift the results to the separable case. The results apply
to all preference formalisms which are (separable) instan-
tiations of our framework.
• We illustrate the notion of separability by showing that
logic programs with ordered disjunction are separable
and, therefore, in principle, admit a simpler, separated
representation.
Abstract Preference Frameworks
We represent preference theories by elements from some set
L. We make no assumptions on the syntax of preference
theories. However, we allow two preference theories to be
combined into a single one. We denote that theory “conjunc-
tion” (or “union”) operation by the symbol ∧. We impose on
∧ the properties of commutativity (the order in which the
theories to be combined are listed should not matter), asso-
ciativity (if more than two theories are to be combined, the
order in which ∧ is applied should not matter), and idempo-
tence (combining a theory with itself should not change the
meaning of the theory). We also assume the existence of a
preference theory, denoted by ⊤, that when conjoined with
any other preference theory, does not change the meaning
of the latter (that is, does not impose any constraints and
does not distinguish between any two outcomes). This is
modeled by assuming that ⊤ is the unit element of ∧. In
preference formalisms considered in the literature, prefer-
ence theories are typically represented as sets of “elemen-
tary” preference formulas. In such cases, L is the power-
set of the set of preference formulas, the union operator
plays the role of ∧ and the empty theory that of ⊤. All
such cases fall under the scope of our abstract representa-
tion. Examples include the penalty and possibilistic logics
(Kaci 2011), answer set optimization (Faber, Truszczyn´ski,
and Woltran 2012), and general CP-nets (Wilson 2004;
Goldsmith et al. 2008).
An algebraic structure L = 〈L,∧,⊤〉 with the proper-
ties we enumerated is a bounded meet semilattice. Bounded
meet semilattices, for simplicity referred to from now on just
as semilattices (as we do not consider any other semilattices
here), arguably represent the weakest abstract desiderata on
the space of preference theories. Semilattices can equiva-
lently be thought of as partially ordered sets that have a
greatest element and in which every finite set has a greatest
lower bound: the relation  defined by x  y if x ∧ y = x
is such a partial order.
Since we do not adopt any syntactic assumptions on pref-
erence theories, we also do not make any assumptions about
the nature of outcomes. We simply assume that they are ele-
ments of some set I of all possible outcomes. To reflect the
fact that preference theories typically encompass both con-
straints and preferences, we specify the semantics of prefer-
ence theories by means of two functions. The first one, ι, as-
signs to each preference theory x its set of feasible outcomes
ι(x). It models the constraints contained in x. However, the
constraints show up only implicitly, we see them through the
effect they have on the outcomes — ι(x) consists precisely
of those outcomes that satisfy all the constraints. The sec-
ond function, ≥, assigns to x the preorder ≥x implied by
the preferences in x. That preorder specifies the concept of
desirability represented by x. If outcomes α, β ∈ I satisfy
α ≥x β, then α is at least as desirable as β. The preferences
in x are, again, implicit, as is the mechanism by which they
are combined to yield the preorder ≥x.
These considerations lead us to the following definition of
an abstract preference framework.
Definition 1 An abstract preference framework (or just a
preference framework) is a quadruple σ = 〈L, I, ι,≥〉,
where L = 〈L,∧,⊤〉 is a semilattice of preference theo-
ries; I is the space of outcomes; ι is a function that assigns
to each x ∈ L a set ι(x) ⊆ I of feasible (or intended) out-
comes for x; and ≥ is a function that assigns to each x ∈ L
a preorder ≥x on I (a binary relation that is reflexive and
transitive).
The preorder ≥x gives rise to its strict version >x. For
every outcomes α, β ∈ I, we define α >x β if α ≥x β and
β 6≥x α, and read α >x β as “α is strictly more desirable
than β in a preference theory x.” For ≻∈ {>,≥} and S ⊆
I, we also use ≻S for the restriction of ≻ to S.
Let σ = 〈L, I, ι,≥〉 be a preference framework. For every
x ∈ L, we define the set of optimal outcomes for x:
pi(x) = {α ∈ ι(x) | for every β ∈ ι(x), β 6>x α}.
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The function pi assigning optimal outcomes to preference
theories determines the semantics of σ.
In some situations, we consider optimality wrt a preorder
≥x but in the context of a set S of outcomes other than ι(x).
In such cases we use the notation
piS(x) = {α ∈ S | for every β ∈ S, β 6>x α}.
Generators and Selectors. Preference theories typically
combine constraint and preference components in a non-
trivial way. Some preference theories can however be re-
garded as concerned exclusively with just one of these
two aspects. We thus define for a preference framework
〈L, I, ι,≥〉 its generator theories Lg , and its its selector the-
ories Lpi as
1. Lg = {x ∈ L | for every y ∈ L, ≥y∧x=≥y},
2. Lpi = {x ∈ L | for every y ∈ L, ι(y ∧ x) = ι(y)}.
Elements in Lg (Lpi , respectively) can be regarded as con-
cerned purely with constraints (preferences, respectively)
as they do not affect preferences (constraints, respectively)
when conjoined with any other preference theory.
In any preference framework 〈L, I, ι,≥〉, since ⊤ is the
unit element of ∧,⊤ ∈ Lg and⊤ ∈ Lpi . Moreover, for every
y, z ∈ Lg ,
≥x∧(y∧z)=≥(x∧y)∧z=≥x∧y=≥x
and for every y, z ∈ Lpi ,
ι(x ∧ (y ∧ z)) = ι((x ∧ y) ∧ z) = ι(x ∧ y) = ι(x).
Thus, both Lg and Lpi are closed under ∧. It follows that
〈Lg,∧,⊤〉 and 〈Lpi,∧,⊤〉 are semilattices and, in fact, sub-
semilattices of 〈L,∧,⊤〉. They can be viewed as “one-
dimensional” preference frameworks concerned with gen-
erating intended outcomes, and with selecting among all
outcomes those optimal wrt preferences. One of the key
questions, which we discuss later in the paper, is whether
a preference framework is “separable,” that is, can be recon-
structed from its one-dimensional “generator” and “selec-
tor” frameworks (or of some sub-frameworks thereof).
(Non)Monotonicity. A semantics s on preference theories,
that is, any function from L to I, for instance, ι or pi, is
monotone if for every x, z ∈ L, s(x ∧ z) ⊆ s(x) (equiva-
lently, if for every x, y ∈ L such that x  y, s(x) ⊆ s(y)).
In general, (the semantics of) preference formalisms are not
monotone as new constraints or preferences (or both) may
“promote” non-optimal outcomes to become optimal. New
constraints may render outcomes that were more desirable
no longer feasible and hence, eliminate them from the op-
timization process; new preferences may put additional im-
portance on some non-optimal outcomes, pushing them up
on the scale of desirability.
If only the preferences behave nonmonotonically, our
framework is already sufficient. However, in general, we
require one further concept determined by ι. An outcome
α ∈ I is potentially intended for a preference theory x ∈ L
if it is an intended outcome of x ∧ z, for some z ∈ L (be-
comes intended under some extension of x). We denote the
set of all potentially intended outcomes of x by µ(x):
µ(x) =
⋃
y∈L
ι(x ∧ y).
Clearly, for every x ∈ L, ι(x) ⊆ µ(x) (since x ∧ ⊤ = x).
One can also check that if ι is monotone then ι(x) = µ(x)
(and then does not need not to be explicitly introduced).
Notions of Equivalence. The fact that preference theories
are not monotonic has an important consequence when con-
sidering two preference theories as equivalent. The first con-
cept that comes to mind is based on the comparison of opti-
mal outcomes: two preference theories x and y are equiva-
lent, written x ≡ y, if they have the same optimal outcomes,
that is, if pi(x) = pi(y). However, extending x and y with
new information z may “promote” to the level of optimality
outcomes that (without z in the picture) were below opti-
mal ones, a manifestation of nonmonotonicity of preference
formalisms discussed above. Hence, pi(x) = pi(y) does not
necessarily imply that pi(x ∧ z) = pi(y ∧ z). In other words,
the equivalence of x and y is too weak to guarantee mutual
replaceability of x and y wrt common new information.
Consequently, an alternative concept of equivalence,
based directly on the idea of replaceability is of more inter-
est. Preference theories x and y are strongly equivalent, writ-
ten x ≡s y, if for every preference theory z, x ∧ z ≡ y ∧ z,
that is, pi(x ∧ z) = pi(y ∧ z). We already mentioned the
concept of separability of a preference framework into its
generator and selector components. These give rise for two
further definitions: preference theories x and y are strongly
g-equivalent, in symbols x ≡gs y, if for each z ∈ L
g ,
pi(x ∧ z) = pi(y ∧ z), and strongly pi-equivalent, in sym-
bols x ≡pis y, if for each z ∈ L
pi , pi(x ∧ z) = pi(y ∧ z). In
this paper we study characterizations of strong equivalence
in the abstract setting of preference frameworks, and show
that strong equivalence of preference theories can be under-
stood in terms of the “one-dimensional” versions of strong
equivalence just introduced.
Separated Preference Frameworks
We start with the case of preference frameworks in which
the separation between constraints and preferences is ex-
plicit. Most of the current preference formalisms are or can
be extended to be in that form. We start by defining “one-
dimensional” preference frameworks which are concerned
only with constraints, resp. with preferences.
A generator framework is a triple σg = 〈G, I, ι〉, where
G = 〈G,∧,⊤〉 is a semilattice, I is a set of outcomes and
ι is a function assigning to each g ∈ G a set ι(g) ⊆ I
of intended outcomes for g. Since the concept of a poten-
tially intended outcome in preference frameworks depends
only on the function ι, it can also be defined for generator
frameworks where, as before we write µ(x) for the set of all
potentially intended outcomes of x ∈ G. For x, y ∈ G, we
write (with some abuse of notation) x ≡s y to denote that
for every z ∈ G, ι(x ∧ z) = ι(y ∧ z) and refer to this rela-
tion as strong equivalence in σg . Strong equivalence implies
equivalence wrt potentially intended outcomes.
Proposition 1 Let G = 〈G,∧,⊤〉 be a generator frame-
work. For every x, y ∈ G, if x ≡s y then µ(x) = µ(y).
A selector framework is a triple σpi = 〈P, I,≥〉, where
P = 〈P,∧,⊤〉 is a semilattice, I is a set of outcomes and
≥ is a function assigning to each p ∈ P a preorder ≥p on
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I. For p, q ∈ P , and S ⊆ I we write p ≡s,S q if for every
r ∈ P , piS(p ∧ r) = piS(q ∧ r) and refer to this relation as
strong equivalence in σpi relative to S.
From a generator framework σg = 〈G, I, ι〉 and a selec-
tor framework σpi = 〈P, I,≥〉, we can build a preference
framework σg × σpi = 〈L, I, ι
′,≥′〉 by setting:
1. L = G × P , that is, L is the product of G and P (L =
G × P ; for every (x, p), (y, q) ∈ L, (x, p) ∧ (y, q) =
(x ∧ y, p ∧ q); and the top element of L is (⊤,⊤))
2. for every (x, p) ∈ L, ι′((x, p)) = ι(x) and ≥′(x,p)=≥p .
We call preference frameworks of that type separated. To
simplify the notation we use the same symbols for the corre-
sponding concepts coming from different semilattices. Thus,
we write ι for ι′ and ≥ for ≥′. We also often write ι(x, p)
for ι((x, p)) and similarly µ(x, p) for µ((x, p)). Finally, we
note that for every (x, p) ∈ L,
µ(x, p) =
⋃
(y,q)∈L
ι((x, p) ∧ (y, q)) =
⋃
(y,q)∈L
ι(x ∧ y, p ∧ q)
=
⋃
y∈G
ι(x ∧ y) = µ(x).
(Here µ on the left-hand side denotes the “µ”-function for L
and the one on the right-hand side the “µ”-function for G.)
To obtain useful characterizations of strong equivalence in
separated frameworks, we impose some additional assump-
tions on generator and selector frameworks. These assump-
tions are natural and hold for many specific formalisms.
The filter property. Let σg = 〈G, I, ι〉 be a generator
framework. An element y ∈ G is a filter if for every x ∈ G,
ι(x∧y) = ι(x)∩µ(y). A preference framework σg satisfies
the filter property if for every outcome α ∈ I, there is a filter
y such that µ(y) = {α}.
The generator promotion (GP) property. A generator
framework σg = 〈G, I, ι〉 satisfies the generator promotion
property if for every x, y ∈ G and every α, β ∈ µ(x)∩µ(y),
there is z ∈ G such that ι(x ∧ z) = ι(y ∧ z) = {α, β}.
All standard constraint satisfaction formalisms, includ-
ing propositional logic and answer set programming (with
choice rules), satisfy both properties.
The first result provides conditions characterizing the
property (x, p) ≡gs (y, q). We note that the statement claim-
ing that µ(x) = µ(y) is justified (cf. Proposition 1).
Theorem 2 Let σg × σpi be a separated preference frame-
work obtained from σg = 〈G, I, ι〉 and σpi = 〈P, I,≥〉,
and let σg satisfy the filter and the GP properties. For every
x, y ∈ G and p, q ∈ P , (x, p) ≡gs (y, q) if and only if x ≡s y
(in σg) and >
µ
p=>
µ
q , where µ is the common value of µ(x)
and µ(y).
This result shows that strong equivalence wrt changing
generators in a separated framework can be characterized
by the strong equivalence in the generator framework, and
a natural condition on the preference orders. An interesting
aspect here is thatG×{⊤} is (in general) a proper subset of
Lg . Nevertheless, ≡gs , which is defined relative to elements
in Lg can be characterized in terms of ≡s in σg , which is
defined relative to elements in G.
Next, we consider strong equivalence wrt changing selec-
tors. As before, we introduce an additional assumption.
The selector promotion (SP) property. For every α, β ∈ I
and for every p, q ∈ P , there is t ∈ P such that (i) α >s β
if and only if α >s∧t β, where s ∈ {p, q}; (ii) for every
γ ∈ I \ {α, β}, γ 6>s∧t α, β, where s ∈ {p, q}.
We note that the SP property is not particularly restrictive.
It holds for many preference formalisms, in particular, for
the selectors used by ASO problems (Faber, Truszczyn´ski,
and Woltran 2012), as well as in preference formalisms
based on some forms of utility such as the penalty and pos-
sibilistic logics.
Theorem 3 Let σg × σpi be a separated preference frame-
work obtained from σg = 〈G, I, ι〉 and σpi = 〈P, I,≥〉,
and let σpi satisfy the SP property. For every x, y ∈ G and
p, q ∈ P , (x, p) ≡pis (y, q) if and only if ι(x) = ι(y) and
p ≡s,ι q (in σpi) with ι the common value of ι(x) and ι(y).
This result shows that strong equivalence wrt changing
selectors in a separated framework, can be characterized by
the strong equivalence in the selector framework relative to
a certain set of outcomes (the set of intended outcomes for
x and y). As before, it is important to stress a non-trivial
aspect of the characterization that comes from the fact that
{⊤} × P is in general a proper subset of Lpi .
Finally, we present results concerning the “combined”
case of strong equivalence in a separated framework.
Theorem 4 Let σg × σpi be a separated preference frame-
work obtained from σg = 〈G, I, ι〉 and σpi = 〈P, I,≥〉,
and let σg satisfy the filter and the GP properties and σpi
satisfy the SP property. For every x, y ∈ G and p, q ∈ P ,
(x, p) ≡s (y, q) if and only if x ≡s y (in σg), and p ≡s,µ q
(in σpi), where µ is the common value of µ(x) and µ(y).
This result shows that strong equivalence in a separated
framework can be characterized by the strong equivalence
of the generator components and the strong equivalence of
the selector components relative to the set of potentially in-
tended outcomes for x and y. Potentially intended outcomes
are relevant here (and not intended outcomes, as in the case
of Theorem 3) because now generators can vary too and that
may make any potentially intended outcome intended in the
extended theory.
Separable Preference Frameworks
A preference framework σ = 〈L, I, ι,≥〉 gives rise to sub-
semilattices Lg = 〈Lg,∧,⊤〉 and Lpi = 〈Lpi,∧,⊤〉, and to
two related preference frameworks:
1. σ∗ = 〈L∗, I, ι,≥〉, where L∗ = {xg ∧ xpi : xg ∈
Lg, xpi ∈ L
pi}, and ι and ≥ are the restrictions to L∗ of
the corresponding functions in σ; it is easy to verify that
L∗ is a (bounded meet) semilattice and a sub-semilattice
of L
2. σ×, the separated framework σg × σpi obtained from the
generator framework σg = 〈L
g, I, ι〉 and the selector
framework σpi = 〈L
pi, I,≥〉.
The strong equivalence concepts in σ× can be expressed in
terms of strong equivalence in σg and σpi as discussed in the
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previous section. We will show that these characterizations
extend to strong equivalence notions in σ∗ and σ. The first
result relates strong equivalence in preference frameworks
σ× and σ∗. Regarding items (2) and (3) in Theorems 5 and
6 below, we note that for elements in L∗, the relations ≡gs
and ≡pis in σ and σ
∗ coincide, as both are defined relative to
the same sets of elements, Lg and Lpi , respectively.
Theorem 5 For every xg, yg ∈ L
g and xpi, ypi ∈ L
pi:
1. xg ∧ xpi ≡s yg ∧ ypi (in σ
∗) if and only if (xg, xpi) ≡s
(yg, ypi)
2. xg ∧ xpi ≡
g
s yg ∧ ypi if and only if (xg, xpi) ≡
g
s (yg, ypi)
3. xg ∧ xpi ≡
pi
s yg ∧ ypi if and only if (xg, xpi) ≡
pi
s (yg, ypi).
Theorem 5 implies that to relate strong equivalence in σ×
and σ, it suffices to relate strong equivalence in σ∗ and σ. To
this end, we need additional concepts and assumptions.
A preference framework σ = 〈L, I, ι,≥〉 is g-complete, if
there is a homomorphism (·)g fromL toLg (that is, for every
x ∈ L, x 7→ xg ∈ Lg) such that for every x ∈ L, ι(x) =
ι(xg). A preference framework 〈L, I, ι,≥〉 is pi-complete,
if there is a homomorphism (·)pi from L to Lpi (that is, for
every x ∈ L, x 7→ xpi ∈ Lpi) such that for every x ∈ L,
≥x=≥xpi . A preference framework 〈L, I, ι,≥〉 is separable
if it is both g- and pi-complete and if:
1. the homomorphism (·)g is the identity on Lg
2. the homomorphism (·)pi is the identity on Lpi
3. for every x ∈ L, (xg)pi ∈ Lg and (xpi)g ∈ Lpi .
We now define a function (·)∗ : L→ L (that is, for every
x ∈ L, x 7→ x∗ ∈ L) by x∗ = xg ∧ xpi .
Theorem 6 Let σ = 〈L, I, ι,≥〉 be a separable preference
framework. For every x, y ∈ L:
1. x ≡s y (in σ) if and only if x
∗ ≡s y
∗ (in σ∗)
2. x ≡gs y (in σ) if and only if x
∗ ≡gs y
∗
3. x ≡pis y (in σ) if and only if x
∗ ≡pis y
∗.
Putting Theorems 5 and 6 together with earlier character-
izations of strong equivalence in separated frameworks, we
obtain the following result of strong equivalence in separa-
ble frameworks.
Theorem 7 Let σ be a separable preference framework,
such that the generator framework σg (of σ
×) satisfies the
filter and the GP properties and the selector framework σpi
(of σ×) satisfies the SP property. Then
1. x ≡gs y if and only if x
g ≡s y
g (in σg) and >
µ
xpi=>
µ
ypi ,
where µ is the common value of µ(x) and µ(y)
2. x ≡pis y if and only if ι(x) = ι(y) and x
pi ≡s,ι y
pi (in σpi),
where ι is the common value of ι(x) and ι(y)
3. x ≡s y if and only if x
g ≡s y
g (in σg) and x
pi ≡s,µ y
pi
(in σpi), where µ is the common value of µ(x) and µ(y).
Characterizing Strong Equivalence in Selector
Frameworks
Strong equivalence in formalisms for specifying constraints
is well understood. In most cases, such formalisms satisfy
a strong monotonicity property that for every theories x
and y, ι(x ∧ y) = ι(x) ∩ ι(y). It is the case for proposi-
tional logic and for all standard constraint satisfaction lan-
guages. That property implies that for every theories x and
y, if ι(x) = ι(y) then for every theory z, ι(x ∧ z) =
ι(y ∧ z). That, in turn, implies that strong and classical
equivalence coincide. The situation is different in the for-
malisms in which the strong monotonicity property above
does not hold. Answer-set programming is a prominent ex-
ample of that class of constraint systems. Strong equivalence
in answer set programming has been thoroughly investigated
and characterizations of its basic form and numerous vari-
ants are well known (Lifschitz, Pearce, and Valverde 2001;
Turner 2003). These results can be used to replace the con-
dition “xg ≡s y
g (in σg)” in Theorem 7 by more specific
ones (depending on a constraint formalism used).
We will now show that under some additional postulates
on selector frameworks we can provide an elegant character-
ization of strong equivalence in selector frameworks, too.
The uniformity property. A selector framework σpi =
〈P, I,≥〉 satisfies the uniformity property if for every
p, q, s ∈ P , ≥p=≥q implies ≥p∧s=≥q∧s.
The conservative promotion (CP) property. For all out-
comes α, β ∈ I and all preferences p, q ∈ P such that
α ≥p β and α 6≥q β there is a preference u ∈ P such
that α >p∧u β and α 6>q∧u β.
Both postulates hold for standard preference formalisms
(for instance, the penalty and the possibilistic logics), and
ASO problems (Faber, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2012).
Theorem 8 Let σpi = 〈P, I,≥〉 be a selector framework
satisfying the uniformity, CP and SP properties. For every
X ⊆ I and for every p, q ∈ P , p ≡s,X q if and only if
≥Xp =≥
X
q .
This theorem can be used to replace the conditions
“p ≡s,X q” and “x
pi ≡s,X y
pi” in the earlier results with
≥Xp =≥
X
q and ≥
X
xpi=≥
X
ypi , respectively (for the appropriate
value of X).
Discussion
Our results on separated frameworks are broadly applicable,
as they rely only on the weakest assumptions on the structure
of generator and selector theories. For instance, our results
on separated frameworks apply to ASO problems and yield
characterizations for the class of “non-ranked” problems ob-
tained by Faber et al. (2012; Corollary 5 and Corollary 14).
Our results on separable frameworks are also of interest.
While preference frameworks that are not explicitly sepa-
rated are not common, some formalisms of that kind were
indeed proposed and studied. A prominent example is the
formalism of logic programs with ordered disjunction or
LPODs (Brewka, Niemela¨, and Syrja¨nen 2004) stemming
from qualitative choice logic (Brewka, Benferhat, and Le
Berre 2002). LPODs can be cast as a preference framework
and, moreover, this framework can be shown to be separable.
We will now state these results formally for a slight general-
ization of LPODs that allows for the use of so-called choice
rules (Simons 1999), which are widely used in answer set
programming.
An LPOD (Brewka, Niemela¨, and Syrja¨nen 2004) is a fi-
nite set of rules. These rules can be ordered disjunction rules
(od rules, for short) of the form
p1×· · ·×pk ← pk+1, . . . , pm,not pm+1, . . . ,not pn (1)
or choice rules of the form
{p1, . . . , pk} ← pk+1, . . . , pm,not pm+1, . . . ,not pn (2)
where (in both cases) 1 ≤ k ≤ m ≤ n, and each pi (1 ≤
i ≤ n) is an atom from a fixed, suitably large universe U . We
denote the positive body atoms of a rule r of form (1) or (2)
by body+(r) = {pk+1, . . . , pm}, the negative body atoms
as body−(r) = {pm+1, . . . , pn}, body atoms body(r) =
body+(r)∪body−(r), head atoms head(r) = {p1, . . . , pk},
and for od rules the i-th head atom as head i(r) = pi and
head<i(r) = {p1, . . . , pi−1} (1 ≤ i ≤ k).
An interpretation I ⊆ U satisfies an od rule r (I |=
r) if I ∩ head(r) 6= ∅ whenever body+(r) ⊆ I , and
I ∩ body−(r) = ∅. A choice rule is satisfied by all inter-
pretations. A model of a program P is an interpretation M
that satisfies all of its rules.
The reduct rI , as defined by Faber, Tompits, and Woltran
(2008), of an od rule r with respect to an interpretation I is
{head i(r)← body
+(r)} if I∩(body−(r)∪head<i(r)) = ∅
and head i(r) ∈ I (i ≤ k); r
I = {headk(r) ← body
+(r)}
if I ∩ (body−(r)∪head(r)) = ∅ (where headk(r) is the last
head atom); and rI = ∅ otherwise. The reduct rI (Simons
1999) of a choice rule r of the form (2) with respect to an
interpretation I is {p ← body+(r) | p ∈ head(r) ∩ I} if
I ∩ body−(r) = ∅; and rI = ∅ otherwise.
The reduct P I of an LPOD P is
⋃
r∈P r
I . An interpreta-
tion I is an answer set if I is the subset minimal model of
P I . The set of all answer sets of P is denoted by AS (P ).
An od rule r contributes to degree j in interpretation I
(vI(r) = j) if body
+(r) ⊆ I , body−(r)∩I = ∅, head j(r) ∈
I , and head<j(r) ∩ I = ∅ (j ≤ k). If body
+(r) * I or
body−(r)∩I 6= ∅, the rule is irrelevant and we set vI(r) = 1.
If I 6|= r (body+(r) ⊆ I , body−(r) ∩ I = ∅, and head(r) ∩
I = ∅), it is also irrelevant and vI(r) = 1. Choice rules
contribute to degree 1 in all interpretations. We denote by
PI [j] the set of rules in an LPOD P that contribute to degree
j in interpretation I .
Given two interpretations I, J of an LPOD P , I >cP J if
there is a k such that |PI [k]| > |PJ [k]|, and for all j < k,
|PI [j]| = |PJ [j]|; I ≥
c
P J if I >
c
P J or |PI [k]| = |PJ [k]|
for all k, k ≥ 1. An interpretation I is a (card)-preferred
answer set of an LPOD P if I ∈ AS (P ) and there is no
J ∈ AS (P ) such that J >cP I .
Since od rules participate both in “generating” answer
sets and in specifying the preference, LPODs do not have
an explicit separated nature. However, LPODs are separa-
ble. To show that, we first note that LPODs give rise to a
semilattice Lod = 〈Lod ,∪, ∅〉, where Lod is the set of all
LPODs over U , ∪ plays the role of ∧ and ∅ the role of⊤, and
σod = 〈Lod , 2
U ,AS ,≥c〉 forms the preference framework
of LPODs under cardinality-based preferences. The notion
of preferred outcomes applied to σod matches exactly the
definition of (card)-preferred answer sets.
To characterize the sub-semilattices L
g
od
and Lpi
od
, we in-
troduce two more definitions.
An LPOD rule is purely generating if it is a choice rule;
an od rule such that body+(r) ∩ body−(r) 6= ∅; an od rule
such that |head(r)| = 1; or an od rule such that head1(r) ∈
body+(r).
An LPOD rule is purely selecting if it is a choice or od
rule such that body+(r)∩ body−(r) 6= ∅; a choice rule such
that head(r) ⊆ body(r); or an od rule such that head i(r) ∈
body+(r) and head<i(r) ⊆ body
−(r).
Proposition 9 For an LPOD P , P ∈ Lg
od
iff each rule in
P is purely generating, and P ∈ Lpi
od
iff each rule r in P is
purely selecting.
The main result now states that σod is separable. To prove
it, one needs to show that σod is g-complete and pi-complete
by providing appropriate homomorphisms (·)g and (·)pi and
show that they satisfy the conditions (1)–(3) of the definition
of separability (we omit details due to space constraints).
Theorem 10 The preference framework σod is separable.
The last two results suggest that the formalism of LPODs
can be presented in a simplified form as a separated one
based on combinations of a generator from L
g
od
and a selec-
tor from Lpi
od
. Combined with the earlier results, they also
provide characterizations of strong equivalence for LPODs.
Conclusions
We introduced abstract preference frameworks as a unifying
language to study fundamental aspects of preferences that
cut across many specific formalisms. We showed the effec-
tiveness of the abstract setting by using it to study the prob-
lems of strong equivalence and separability.
Our paper suggests several open problems. First, our con-
ditions for separability are quite restrictive as they require
that Lg and Lpi be used as generators and selectors, respec-
tively. These sets were defined to contain every element that
could possibly be regarded as a generator or a selector, re-
spectively. They may, however, contain redundant elements.
Using “non-redundant” sub-semilattices of Lg and Lpi may
lead to simpler and more natural “separations.” Next, many
specific preference formalisms explicitly “rank” preferences
according to their importance. It is therefore of interest to
find an abstract account for ranks in preference frameworks
and extend our results to that broader setting. Finally, a com-
prehensive study of specific preference formalisms from the
perspective of abstract preference frameworks (we alluded
to some results here and considered in more detail just one,
LPODs) is also left for the future.
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